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INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
I. Introduction 
While the diffusion of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) across economically 
advanced countries has attracted much scholarly attention in recent years, systematic 
work on their spread across developing countries is still scarce.
1 In an effort to address 
this gap in literature, this paper aims to analyze the diffusion of regulatory agencies in 
emerging economies in Latin America, Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe. At this 
early stage of our research, we aim to emprically map out regulatory agencies in 
economic regulation sectors (e.g. competition, finance, and utilities/infrastructure) 
enjoying some degree of autonomy or independence in emerging economies, rather than 
limiting our focus solely on those that meet all the criteria for independence in the 
strictest definition of the term.
2 Such exploratory analysis constitutes the first step 
towards studying processes of diffusion in general and the mechanisms that lead to the 
creation of regulatory agencies in these economies in particular. The second objective of 
this paper is to examine the mechanisms which we expect to be at work in the spread of 
IRAs in the selected emerging economies.
3 We argue that despite the creation of a 
number of agencies in the countries concerned before 1990, diffusion has become evident 
and “interdependent”, as opposed to spurious
4 in the 1990s.    
Although the foundations of studies focusing on organizational homogenization 
and institutional isomorphism date back to Weber ([1922] 1978; 1952), it is especially 
                                                 
1 Studies of IRAs in Latin American countries by Levi-Faur (2003), Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005) are 
among the rare examples. 
2 To qualify as an IRA an agency should derive its own power and responsibilities from an act of law, it 
must have an organizational structure completely separate from ministries (in the sense of being neither 
appointed nor managed directly by elected officials), and it must have at least a certain level of financial 
independence. See Giraldi (2002) for an index of formal independence of IRAs. 
3 Our sample includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela in Latin America, 
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Phillippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand in Asia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Turkey in Central and Eastern Europe. 
4 According to Giraldi, “... diffusion proper occurs only when actors behave interdependently. When this 
does not occur, a diffusion-like pattern of adoptions can still emerge, notably if actors react to similar 
functional pressures, but in this case diffusion should be considered spurious.” (2004: 118)   3
since the beginning of the 1990s that conceptual and theoretical literature on diffusion of 
policies and organizational forms has developed substantially in political science. As 
comprehensive reviews of relevant literature and research traditions as well as surveys 
and classifications of mechanisms of diffusion have been presented at length by various 
scholars
5, we will not go into a similar endeavor here. Nevertheless, it is necessary to 
briefly elaborate on the mechanisms that comprise the framework of this paper. 
We agree with Giraldi that “trying to discriminate empirically between different 
mechanisms should be a central concern of diffusion research” and that “attempting to 
supply a full answer in a single research project would be unrealistic.” (2004: 118) 
Recognizing the empirical limits and difficulties involved in examining multiple 
mechanisms in the same paper, we, specifically, focus on a few mechanisms which,  we 
see as deserving primary attention, in the spread of regulatory agencies in emerging 
economies. The first mechanism involves international coercion. According to DiMaggio 
and Powell, “coercive isomorphism”  
 
results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations 
by other organizations which they are dependent and by cultural 
expectations in the society within which organizations function. Such 
pressures may be felt as force, persuasion, or as invitations to join in 
collusion. (1991: 67) 
 
This broad formulation encompasses a few distinct, yet related and often simultaneous, 
processes with voluntary and coercive aspects. Pressures exerted by intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) lie at the core of our explanation for the diffusion of regulatory 
agencies in emerging economies. These pressures may be highly coercive in the form of 
direct influence through conditionality for provision of loans, e.g. by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and/or the World Bank, or for membership, e.g. by the European 
Union (EU). 
Still another mechanism by which “dominant actors”, including economically 
advanced states, IGOs, and private investors, promote diffusion of policies and 
                                                 
5 For example, see DiMaggio and Powell (1991), Bennett (1991), Dolowitz and Marsh (1996; 2000), James 
and Lodge (2003), Giraldi (2004), Levi-Faur (2005), Elkins and Simmons (2005), Lazer (2005), and 
Meseguer (2005).  4
institutions is what Henisz, Zelner, and Guillén (2005) call, “indirect coercion” based on 
the assumption that there are domestic groups with different policy and institutional 
preferences in emerging economies. In such cases, “the intervention of an outsider or 
third party tilt the balance of power toward the group (or groups) favoring reform by 
providing that group with more resources, legitimacy, or rhetorical arguments, and by 
prompting various groups to join in the pro-reform coalition.” (Henisz, Zelner, and 
Guillén 2005: 12) Consequently, policies and institutional changes that cannot be agreed 
on and introduced through the dynamics of internal (i.e. domestic) political processes can 
be more readily done so with the involvement of pressures from external actors 
advocating similar changes in policies and institutions. 
Moreover, IGOs, such as the IMF, World Bank, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), World Trade Organization (WTO), Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and regional development banks as well as the EU, play 
a very active and influential role in the formulation and spread of certain ideas, programs, 
and organizational forms as the “best” or “to be taken-for-granted” practices. In the case 
of emerging economies, dependence on and competition for foreign loans and investment 
(both direct and portfolio) for economic stability, growth, and development, especially in 
times of crisis, facilitate the adoption of ideas, programs, and organizational forms that 
conform to those that are being institutionalized in the international society, particularly 
by “dominant actors”. Once they are “approved” as the “best” or the “natural” 
organizational forms in the international society, countries that seek to become and 
remain members of that society are compelled to “imitate” in order to maintain and 
enhance their credibility and competitiveness as well as to legitimate other decisions, 
such as liberalization and privatization, made to serve similar ends.
6 In other words, IRAs 
may be created voluntarily, but as Dolowitz and Marsh put it, “driven by perceived 
necessity.” (2000: 13) In sum, we contend that international coercion and symbolic 
imitation are the two most salient mechanisms in the diffusion of regulatory agencies in 
emerging economies.  
                                                 
6 For instance, as Giraldi (2004) exemplifies in his discussion of “symbolic imitation”, governments may 
create independent regulators so as to legitimate liberalization of utilities. 
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The paper is organized under three subsequent headings. The next section adopts 
a perspective that relies on the mechanisms of international coercion and symbolic 
imitation in explaning the diffusion of IRAs in the countries in our sample in the light of 
illustrative examples from selected emerging economies. As it tries to reveal the 
operation of these mechanisms, it also aims to distinguish where they remain insufficient 
to provide a full explanation by bringing in alternative or complementary mechanisms at 
work. Acknowleding that studies of a relatively large number of cases often fail to 
accurately capture the complexity of diffusion processes, the third section of the paper 
presents a case study of diffusion of IRAs in Turkey as an emerging economy. The paper 
concludes with a presentation of its major findings within the framework of mechanisms 
of diffusion included in this study and suggestions for future research in this area. 
 
II. Mechanisms of Diffusion and the Spread of IRAs in Emerging Economies 
 
Pre-1990s: Limited Diffusion 
 
Before the 1990s, a small number of regulatory agencies were created in some of today’s 
emerging economies. The earliest example is Colombia’s Superintendency of Banks 
(Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia) which was established in 1923 in financial 
services, particularly, banking, sector as a supervisory body. It was one of the projects 
developed by the Kemmerer Commission, led by Edwin W. Kemmerer, a professor of 
economics at the Princeton University, and composed of a group of other North 
American experts who were contracted by the President of Colombia to reorganize the 
country’s financial, monetary, and fiscal institutions. This was one of the so-called 
“money doctor missions” of the 1920s whose aimed included the stabilization of national 
currencies and banking systems. These missions were American technical missions 
aiming to “transmit economic knowledge and techniques to the host country” (Patton 
1999:46). From 1923 until 1931, missions led by Kemmerer advised the national 
authorities on the introduction of far-reaching monetary, banking and fiscal reforms, not 
only in Colombia, but also in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Mexico, Guatemala, 
Germany, South Africa, Poland, China and Turkey. Although bodies equivalent of the 
Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia were not established in many of these countries, 
these commissions played a significant role in structuring institutions, especially central  6
banks, in most. Hence, it may be argued that experts from powerful states, in this case, 
the United States, had already started diffusing policies and organizational forms to the 
rest of the international society as early as the 1920s. 
As the above example shows and  as Jordana and Levi-Faur (2005) assert, the 
idea of governance through autonomous regulatory agencies has some historical roots in 
Latin America. Yet, they have almost exclusively been in financial sectors. Aside from 
central banks, Argentina’s Comisión Nacional de Valores (1968), besides Colombia’s 
Superintendencia Bancaria, is the other early example included in our sample.  
It is not until the mid-1970s that we observe the creation of regulatory agencies 
more systematically. As it had been “the first nation in the world to break with the 
dominant postwar policy paradigm by implementing a radical package of free-market 
reforms” (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 542) involving liberalization and 
privatization after the military coup of 1973, Chile also emerged as a pioneer in the 
creation of regulatory agencies. 1975,  the year its first economic regulatory agency, 
namely, Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, was established was 
also when the IMF required a much harsher set of measures after the failure of its 1974 
standby arrangement with Chile and when the so-called “Chicago Boys”, that is, a group 
comprised of those who participated in a U.S. program for training Chilean economists at 
the University of Chicago, rose to positions of influence in economic policy making. 
Although the IMF had not yet included regulatory reform as a condition for its loans, its 
pressure coupled with the domestic political conditions in the country facilitated the 
penetration of  “foreign” economic policies and organizational forms into the decision 
making structure. As the Pinochet regime delegated tremendous responsibility to the 
Chicago boys, they could carry out their programs including liberalization of markets, 
privatization of utilities, and creation of a regulatory framework to support and legitimize 
these measures. Subsequently, the regulatory agencies that started their operations in 
Chile in the 1970s and 1980s were those in competition, financial services, security and 
exchange, as well as privatized utilities sectors, namely, gas, electricity, and 
telecommunications.  However, the Chilean government did not create “independent” 
industry-specific regulatory agencies, for instance, for telecommunications and 
electricity.   7
In telecommunications, it established the Undersecretary of Telecommunications 
(SUBTEL) as an office within the Ministry of Economy and assigned regulatory 
functions to it. In the electricity sector it gave regulatory powers to a National 
Electricity Commission (CNE), formed by a group of cabinet members. It did not 
give enforcement powers to the control agency (Electricity and Fuels 
Superintendence) it inherited; neither did it maintain any supervision of the 
independent system operator, in charge of electricity dispatch and controlled by 
large generators. (Murillo 2002: 481-481)  
 
This points to a critical difference between the early neoliberalism and the neoliberalism 
of the post-1990 period. Neoliberals’ low preference for state intervention in the 1980s 
was transformed into a preference of re-regulation in the 1990s that would be also evident 
in the prescriptions and conditions of IMF and/or World Bank supported programs, 
especially after the mid-1990s.   
The number of IRAs created in today’s emerging economies, other than Chile, 
remained limited before the 1990s. One may suspect some regional diffusion as, for 
instance, “the military dictatorship in Argentina emulated some Chilean policies” 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, 2002: 545) and established a competition agency 
(Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia) in 1980. Yet, evidence in regards to 
the creation of one or two IRAs in different sectors in a few countries, i.e. Colombia, 
Phillippines, Indonesia, Turkey, in the late 1970s and 1980s does not suffice to show 
“interdependent” diffusion. 
 
From the 1990s to the Present: Acceleration of Diffusion 
 
Jordana and Levi-Faur specify 1992 as the year after which the rate of growth of new 
regulatory agencies increase in Latin America. They find that 
 
[f]rom a meager 43 regulatory authorities created before 1979 (mostly in the 
financial sector), the overall number had grown threefold to 138 by 2002. In 
addition, the autonomy of all but 5 of the agencies set up before 1979 was enhanced 
through legislation.
7 (2005: 103) 
 
                                                 
7 Their data cover regulatory authorities in nine economic regulation sectors, namely, central banking, 
financial services, securities and exchange, competition, telecommunications, electricity, gas, water, and 
post, and three social regulation sectors, namely, pharmaceuticals, environment, and food safety, in 
nineteen Latin American countries.  8
Parallel to the developments in Latin America, creation of IRAs took off in other 
emerging economies after 1992. This was not independent from major changes in the 
general international context. The 1990s were the years of rapid transformation and crises 
that left virtually no part of the international society unaffected. The end of the Cold War 
and economic collapse of communist systems culminated in the announced victory of 
market economy. In the absence of a viable competing ideology and policy paradigm, it 
has become “a taken-for-granted way to represent, and act upon, the economic world”. 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002: 534) Thus, liberalization and privatization that 
had already started in the 1980s, accelerated and reached to parts of the world, such as 
Central and Eastern Europe, that it had not or could not before. The eagerness of the CEE 
countries to be integrated to the world economy and to accede to the EU further 
facilitated this process. 
  Another critical development of the 1990s was the neoliberals’ shift from de-
regulation to regulatory reform or re-regulation. Before the 1990s, while they encouraged 
privatization as a part of their agenda, the IMF/World Bank programs did not emphasize 
or require regulatory reforms including the creation of IRAs. The need for a sound 
regulatory framework for the sustainability of economic reforms was realized in the 
1990s, particularly following the financial crises in emerging economies. Currently, there 
is widespread agreement that independent regulators are at the heart of governance for 
liberalized sectors. The IMF, World Bank, OECD, WTO, APEC, regional development 
banks as well as the EU all recommend and “encourage” the creation of IRAs. In many 
countries, they work together to promote IRAs based on some division of labor. For 
instance, while the IMF includes the creation of IRAs in financial sectors in its 
conditionality, the World Bank focuses on the formation of those in privatized 
utilities/infrastructure sectors.  “In 1993 the World Bank explicitly extended 
conditionality agreements to the infrastructure sector by making evidence of market-
oriented infrastructure reform a precondition for any project lending.” (Henisz, Zelner, 
and Guillén 2005: 14) Expansion of IMF/World Bank conditionality coupled with 
“prescriptive” pressures from other IGOs, such as the OECD and APEC, have created 
conditions which countries that seek to “emerge” as strong and competitive economies 
can hardly resist. Therefore, the acceleration of diffusion of IRAs in emerging economies  9
after 1990 can be attributed to international coercion in various forms and/or to voluntary 
adoption driven by necessity.  
In this section, we primarily analyze the aforementioned mechanisms at work in 
diffusion of IRAs in emerging markets. There are of course some empirical difficulties in 
documenting the IMF and World Bank loan conditions for all years. Systematic data on 
specific loans are scarce because neither the IMF nor the World Bank published the terms 
of loan agreements prior to 1996. They were not made public by national governments, 
either. Hence, in our analysis of pre-1996 period, we rely on indirect evidence and 
caution against making definite conclusions. 
 
Latin America 
The 1990s, during which IRAs spread across Latin America, was also a period of rapid 
liberalization and privatization for many countries in the region. While governments that 
had more cautiously initiated reforms in the 1980s after the debt crisis accelerated the 
process, those that resisted change could no longer do so after the evident failure of old 
economic models and policies to deal with emerging economic difficulties and crises. 
The announcement of the Brady Plan in 1989 had a critical impact on the reform process 
in the 1990s. As it offered debt relief as an incentive, the Plan linked the easing of credit 
terms with the Latin American debtors’ acceptance of the IMF and World Bank 
requirements for liberal market reforms. (Cohn 2000: 184) In addition to making prior 
commitment to such reforms a precondition for debt relief, the Plan also introduced 
structural adjustment beyond policy change. Creation of new competition regulatory 
agencies in Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela in 1992 and strengthening of those 
established earlier, such as the substantial reform of Brazil’s Conselho Administrativo de 
Defesa Econômico in 1994 can be viewed as measures to show commitment to and to 
legitimize decisions to liberalize markets.  
Another general observation is the institutionalization of IRAs in privatized 
utilities/infrastructure sectors. Privatization, which was also promoted by the Brady Plan, 
proceeded at different speeds and took different forms across Latin America. On one 
hand, there were those like Argentina that started as early as late 1980s and privatized 
almost every asset that the state owned, including in gas, electricity, highways, and oil  10
industries, in a very short period of time (1989-1992) and on the other hand, there were 
also those that lagged behind, such as Peru.
8 While the timing, speed, and breadth of 
privatization may account for the time IRAs were created in these sectors, it should be 
also be underlined that effective regulatory reforms were not introduced in many Latin 
American countries at the time privatization was launched. For example, there was no 
regulatory agency in telecommunications when the Mexican government took the 
decision to privatize the industry. It was years after, in 1995, that a Federal 
Communications Law, establishing Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones, as an 
agency with broad regulatory power, was passed. In Argentina, even though laws 
establishing such agencies were passed around the time of privatization, they were not 
present at the time most purchases were made. (Ariceta 2004) In other words, adoption of 
new organizational forms did not always occur simultaneously with the adoption of new 
policies. Besides possible domestic political factors, may the absent, or at most weak, 
international coercion to introduce rigorous regulatory reforms during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s be a factor behind this time lag? 
In the context of Latin American emerging markets, it is difficult to make an 
accurate assessment of the real impact conditionality, as a coercive instrument, had on the 
establishment of IRAs since most were created during the period when international 
financial institutions had not yet started making their loan conditions public. Thus, we 
have to rely on indirect evidence in addition to a small number of letters of intent for 
countries that created IRAs after that period. As is mentioned before, the World Bank has 
explicitly made market-oriented infrastructure reform a precondition for project lending 
since only 1993. Hence, it is not likely that the Bank went as far as including the creation 
of IRAs in infrastructure sectors as a formal and strict condition for lending before then.  
On the other hand, when the way the World Bank had generally interacted with 
the Latin American governments is examined, it becomes clear that it had other methods 
for influencing, if not coercing, them. In addition to its financial support, many Latin 
American countries relied on the Bank for so called “technical assistance” in introducing 
and implementing market reforms. “In some cases, direct supervision was an essential 
                                                 
8 The Peruvian government’s intention “to privatize enterprises in the energy sector” was issued as late as 
its May 5 1998 letter of intent submitted to the IMF. The letter is available at 
www.imf.org/external/np/loi/050598.htm.  11
part of propelling reform forward.” (Teichman 2004: 40) Yet, in such a situation, it is 
difficult to empirically differentiate the degree and form of coercion as well as the 
specific mechanism of diffusion at work. It was coercive in the sense that introduction 
and implementation of structural as well as policy changes prescribed by the staffs of  
international financial institutions was required for funding. At the same time, another 
line of argument may be based on the diffusion of ideas to “willing pupils” or among 
“like-minded” technocrats. In some Latin American countries, such as Mexico, major 
national decision makers and/or their advisors were mostly trained technocrats with 
graduate degrees in economics or public administration from prestigious U.S. 
universities. As such, they were members of the same epistemic communities
9 to which 
the professional staffs of international financial institutions belonged to. It was often not 
through formal agreements, but through informal discussions and negotiations with 
Mexico’s technocratic elite that the World Bank staff affected policy and institutional 
change in the country. As Teichman puts it, 
[c]onsidering … that explicit policy conditionality generally failed to 
induce countries to carry out policies they opposed, the imposition of 
reforms through policy-based loans may not have been the most important 
way multilaterals contributed to policy reforms. Policy “influence”, 
although acknowledged as a concept that is slippery and hard to measure, 
may have been important nonetheless. (2004: 40) 
 
Whether it is called “policy influence” for countries like Mexico or “persuasion” within 
the context of countries where the staffs of international financial institutions did not find 
like-minded technocratic leaders, this mechanism still does not disagree with DiMaggio 
and Powell’s (1991) definition of coercive isomorphism.
10 Moreover, if the policy-
relevant knowledge the members of epistemic communities, regardless of their 
nationality, claiming to have authority over is knowledge originating from “prestigious” 
U.S. institutions, the described process may as well be termed ideational or ideological 
coercion. 
                                                 
9 Haas defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
knowledge in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevan knowledge within that 
domain or issue area.” In his definition, “what bonds members of an epistemic community is their shared 
belief or faith in the verity and applicability of particular forms of knowledge or specific truths.” (1992: 3) 
10 See the definition on pp. 3/  12
In the 1990s, the IMF also realized the increasing utility of “soft coercion” in the 
form of “technical assistance” as a means to ensure the introduction and continuation of 
reforms. In addition to providing training to national bureaucrats, technocrats, and 
regulators it increased the number and frequency of its field missions. For example, 
between 1991 and 2002, it dispatched some 50 missions to Argentina where it has almost 
continuously engaged in since 1991. (IMF 2003)  
However, as our discussion of Asian emerging economies in the next section will 
more clearly show, conditionality continues to be a significant coercive instrument for the 
IMF in promoting policy and institutional reforms in emerging economies. Among the 
provisions of Venezuela’s 1996 standby arrangement are the resumption of privatization, 
including the sale of remaining government shares in the telecommunications company 
and the sale of state-owned aluminum, steel, and electricity companies, as well as the 
strengthening of bank supervision.
11  Peru’s letter of intent, dated May 5 1998, expresses 
the government’s intention to privatize enterprises in the energy, mining, insurance, 
cement, and agricultural sectors. Moreover, the creation of IRAs in some sectors is 
specified as accomplishments to support its request for additional lending: “Earlier this 
year the specialized regulatory agency for energy, OSINERG, became operational, and 
the government established a specialized regulatory agency, OSITRAN, to supervise 
compliance with concession contract in public transportation infrastructure.”
12 Peru’s 
subsequent letter of intent, dated June 7 1999, in addition to declaring that the 
government has sold major public enterprises in telecommunications, energy, financial, 
fishing, and mining sectors and reduced its participation in the electricity and petroleum 
sectors, emphasizes realized regulatory reforms, such as the strengthening of the 
Superintendency of Banks and Insurance by a new banking law in 1996. Intensification 
of structural reforms, including privatization and strengthening the regulatory framework 
for economic activities, is listed as one of the cornerstones of its 1999-2002 program for 
which it sought financial support from the IMF.
13  
Although, for Latin American emerging economies, we have not come across any 
specific conditions for the creation of independent regulatory agencies in the few letters 
                                                 
11 See www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1996/pr9638.htm. 
12 See www.imf.org/external/np/loi/050598.htm. 
13 See www.imf.org/external/np/loi/060799.htm.  13
of intent that are publicly available, the inclusion of provisions related to improving 
regulatory framework and supervision in various sectors may be viewed as evidence for 
diffusion of regulatory capitalism in the region by the IMF. The specification of 
providing the Superintendencia Bancaria de Colombia with more autonomy and 
regulatory power among the main recommendations of the country’s 2005 Financial 
System Stability Assessment Update prepared by a staff team of the IMF and the World 
Bank (IMF 2005) is an example showing their advocacy not only for the creation of 
regulatory agencies, but also for granting them maximum autonomy and independence. 
What we observe is an ongoing process (towards regulatory capitalism) that does not 
terminate when regulatory agencies, short of full autonomy and independence, are 
established. 
Over the 1990s, besides the IMF and the World Bank, other international 
institutions have emerged as actors in the diffusion of regulatory reforms in Latin 
America. Most visibly, NAFTA, dominated by the U.S., had important effects on 
Mexico’s regulatory framework. Mexico was certainly the party that most ambitiously 
pushed for the signing of NAFTA by taking unilateral measures to ease trade restrictions 
before seeking negotiations with the U.S. However, this was a voluntary action “driven 
by perceived necessity.” According to Cohn (2000), the inability of Mexico’s early 
liberalization efforts to persuade foreign investors that these changes would be permanent 
because of the country’s long history of government intervention had shown that 
additional measures to enhance credibility were needed. A free trade agreement with the 
U.S. would provide this. A similar logic can be used to explain Mexico’s initiatives to 
improve its regulatory framework. It cannot be a mere coincidence that Mexico made its 
competition IRA operational in 1992, the year NAFTA was signed. Subsequently, in 
1994, Mexico, joined the OECD, which is still another international organization 
currently promoting regulatory reform. As a country that has volunteered to join both 
NAFTA and OECD, Mexico revealed its willingness to adopt organizational forms that 
are labeled as “best” practices by these bodies dominated by economically advanced 
countries. Within this context, creation of IRAs can be interpreted as “symbolic 
imitation” by a country that seeks to accomplish its goals by being integrated into the  14
society of states. That, of course, necessitates conforming to the values and norms 
institutionalized in that society.  
 
Asia 
As Table 2 (see Appendix) reveals, although a couple of IRAs were created in Asian 
emerging economies before 1990, most were added to the countries’ institutional 
structures over the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, it can be argued that mechanisms of diffusion 
leading to the spread of IRAs in Asia were at work.  
Those established in the early 1990s were predominantly in the securities and 
exchange sector, e.g. in India, Malaysia, and Thailand. This largely coincides with the 
outset of liberalization of capital markets in these countries. Rather than being dictated by 
international organizations, these earlier examples can be accurately viewed as voluntary 
initiatives by national governments perceiving the necessity of creating more investor-
friendly capital markets. For instance, following a major economic crisis, India, in 1991, 
launched economic policy reforms unprecedented in its economic history. Although India 
asked and made a standby arrangement with the IMF at the time, the coercive impact of 
its conditionality can be debated. In his analysis of economic reforms of the 1990s in 
India, Nayar contends that “the conditionalities could hardly be labelled dictation, for in 
some … respects India soon went beyond those requirements because of its own 
perception that that was what was necessary in its situation.” (1998: 347) Nevertheless, 
this should not be viewed independent from the post-Cold War environment in which the 
market economy and economic ideas disseminated by “dominant actors” came to enjoy 
almost a monopolistic status. It was the finance minister of India himself who quoted 
Victor Hugo: “no power on earth can stop an idea whose time has come.” (Cited in Nayar 
1998: 349). While India’s economic restructuring can be interpreted as an example of 
“symbolic imitation”, it is also possible to see it as the outcome of a learning process. As 
Nayar puts it, 
[I]f ideas area important in the Indian stance, they are important, however, 
not for some inherent power of their own but only in the light of India’s 
past economic performance. Through a process of “social learning” key 
leaders had come to the understanding that earlier policies had failed to 
meet India’s own goals and there was hardly any merit in persisting with  15
them. The same conclusion was, of course, self-evident to the IFIs, but the 
line of causality was different in India’s experience. (1998: 350) 
 
Even though these arguments regarding India’s liberalization experience may be 
somewhat loosely connected with the creation of the Securities and Exchange Board of 
India, as an IRA, in 1992, they are illustrative of the limits of international coercion as 
the only dominant mechanism of diffusion of policies and institutions in emerging 
markets. 
  On the other hand, international coercion emerges as an effective mechanism of 
diffusion in the spread of IRAs after the mid-1990s in Asia. This can be most effectively 
documented for the establishment of IRAs in financial sectors and the enhancement of 
their autonomy and independence after creation during the post-financial crisis years in 
the region. Financial sector reforms were at the core of IMF-supported programs for 
Asian countries affected by crisis. Within this framework, for instance, S. Korea’s letter 
of intent, dated December 3, 1997, included the promise of passing a bill “to consolidate 
supervision of all banks (including specialized banks), merchant banks, securities firms, 
and insurance companies in an agency with operational and financial autonomy”, in 
addition to revised Bank of Korea Act providing for central bank independence.
14 
Subsequently, the legislature swiftly passed the new legislation establishing the Financial 
Supervisory Board in 1998. Before the crisis, a proposal for a new autonomous 
supervisory authority had met with considerable resistance. (Lindgren, et. al. 1999) The 
ability of the IMF to expand conditionality to cover specific regulatory reforms including 
the establishment of an autonomous agency can be tied to the country’s need for 
immediate financial assistance and readiness to accept whatever conditions are offered to 
it. If S. Korea had not complied, the IMF could withhold a disbursement of two billion 
USD. (Davis 1997)  
In addition to such direct coercion, in the case of S. Korea, a mechanism of 
indirect coercion, may be working in tandem. The fact that a proposal for the institution 
of a similar agency was already being debated before the crisis points to the presence of 
those favoring such reform, but facing political opposition in the absence of pressure 
from the IMF. Its inclusion in the IMF-supported program empowered the supporters of a 
                                                 
14 The letter of intent is available at www.imf.org/external/np/loi/120397.htm.  16
new IRA by providing them resources and legitimacy. This is what Henisz, Zelner, and 
Guillén (2005) call “indirect coercion” by third parties. 
  Letters of intent and memoranda of Asian countries affected by the crisis all 
included provisions such as “strengthening supervision”, “regulatory oversight”, and/or 
increasing the independence and autonomy of financial supervisors. Having channeled 
large sums of financial assistance to these countries, the IMF also put them under close 
surveillance to ensure its conditions were met as scheduled. This was especially the case 
for three crisis countries. Staff from the IMF’s Monetary and Exchange Affairs and 
Washington-based consultants spent about ten staff years in the field missions to 
Indonesia, S. Korea, and Thailand during 1998 and 1999 fiscal years. Moreover, the Fund 
placed resident banking supervisors in Indonesia and Thailand, and sent expert missions 
to S. Korea. (Lindgren, et. al. 1999) In sum, the degree and form of coercive pressures 
imposed on these countries were quite unprecedented in the history not only of these 
countries, but also of the IMF. 
  Another area where the coercive effects of the IMF and the World Bank have 
been increasingly felt in the region is in the privatization and regulation of 
utilities/infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications, gas, electricity (or energy 
in general), and water. Although these sectors are mostly in the Bank’s domain of 
operation, they have also been included in some letters of intent submitted to the IMF. 
For example, the privatization strategy that is specified in Thailand’s letter of intent, 
dated May 26 1998, provides for the development of an “effective regulatory framework 
for the public utilities to be applicable to the private sector operators, especially in water, 
power, and telecommunications, to promote competition and regulate monopolies”, “the 
establishment of regulatory capacity for water and transport sectors.” Thus far, progress 
has been limited; yet, the creation of Thailand’s National Telecommunications 
Commission as an IRA in 2004 can be regarded as a sign of slow, but advancing, 
diffusion. Similarly, Phillippines March 11 1998 memorandum lists a comprehensive 
restructuring of the electric power sector with the assistance of the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank and strengthening the Energy Regulation Board’s 
organizational and regulatory capacity as a part of its 1998-1999 program. In this context, 
the country’s Energy Regulatory Commission started to operate in 2001.  17
  Among the Asian countries in our sample, India is one of those where the World 
Bank has been most intensely involved in and for a relatively longer period in 
restructuring utilities sectors, especially energy. The Bank’s energy lending to India 
followed the governments’ lead till 1993, that is, the year it started to explicitly extend 
conditionality to market-oriented infrastructure reform. After the 1990-1991 crisis in 
India, the Bank canceled over two billion USD in nonperforming loans and shifted the 
focus of its lending strategy to the electricity sector’s institutional, financial, and 
environmental sustainability. “The Bank would lend only to states that agreed to totally 
unbundle their electricity boards, privatize distribution, and facilitate environmental 
reform, and the private sector’s involvement in power generation.” (World Bank 
Operations Evaluation Department 2001: 2) After a three-year period (1993-1996) of no 
energy lending to India, the Bank provided loans for three restructuring projects in the 
sector between 1996 and 1999. This was the interval during which the Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission as well as a number of state-level electricity IRAs, such as 
Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission, were established. The World Bank evidently 
played the role of an effective “diffuser” of organizational forms in this case. A 
comprehensive analysis of World Bank lending across countries since 1993 is highly 
likely to support this conclusion.
15  
  Among the Asian emerging economies included in this study, China and Taiwan 
have been the ones most strongly resisting the mechanisms of diffusion at work. 
Although they have instituted a few separate regulatory agencies, they have, thus far, 
remained under the jurisdiction of the executive in Taiwan and of the State Council in 
China. While showing the limits of diffusion of “independent” regulatory agencies, these 
cases also evidence the impact of external pressures on even the governments that are 
reluctant to introduce political institutional change. In aspiring to be integrated to the 
global markets and to join the WTO, China has acquiesced to adopting at least the 
minimal requirements of being a part of the international society. The creation of 
separate, but not independent China Securities and Exchange Commission (1998), China 
Insurance Regulatory Commission (1998), and China Banking Regulatory Commission, 
                                                 
15 See “infrastructure” and related topics at www.worldbank.org for the Bank’s operations in this area.   18
may be interpreted as efforts at “symbolic imitation”. As such, China is not totally 
immune from the effects of diffusion, either. 
 
Central and Eastern Europe 
Table 3 (see Appendix) provides a list of regulators in Central Eastern European (CEE) 
countries. The table reveals that creation of IRAs in these countries picked up pace 
towards the end of 1990s, similar to emerging economies in other parts of the world but 
for somewhat different reasons. 
As was the case for a host of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
remainder of the former Soviet Union that emerged from the dissolution of the Soviet 
bloc starting in 1989, CEE countries chose to move their economies toward market based 
systems with a view to integrating swiftly into the rest of the world economy. Towards 
this end, they engaged in extensive liberalization of the economy and undertook major 
restructuring of their institutions and economic decision-making processes, a process 
fittingly called “transition”. 
Designing regulatory mechanisms for liberalizing markets and newly privatized 
state-owned operators in infrastructure sectors was part of this transition process and 
almost all transition countries received significant support of sorts from the IMF, the 
World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and other 
international donor instutions, support for which they were very willing recipients. 
Furthermore, as Hanley, King, and Janos state in regards to Hungary, the external 
pressures from these institutions national governments confronted in CEE countries 
during the 1990s “did not push in divergent directions but worked in unison toward 
establishing in as short a time frame as possible a functioning market economy in which 
foreign investments were both welcome and secure.” (2002: 150) The cooperation and 
coordination among these institutions were evident by the fact that they operated based 
on a division of labor in assisting the transformation of CEE economies.  
Reviewing the evidence on the IMF’s involvement in the restructuring of CEE 
economies, it becomes evident that the IMF concentrated on overall reorientation of the 
economies and macroeconomic stabilization than restructuring of sectors at the micro  19
level.
 16 In letters of intent submitted by transition countries as part of standby agreements 
and in other related documents on IMF’s involvement in the region there is hardly any 
detail on sector level restructuring apart from drawing attention to importance of what are 
called “structural reforms” in various sectors.
17 The only exception is micro level reforms 
in the banking sector and the financial sector overall, the main domain of activity for the 
IMF. The IMF provided very detailed advice for reform in these sectors and followed up 
on the pledges for reform by country governments through attaching conditionality to 
further lending. 
Providing advice and steering of the actual process of structural adjustment at 
micro level in key sectors has primarily been the domain of activity for the World Bank, 
at least in the initial years of transition. The World Bank has had a strong presence in all 
transition countries and was the driving force behind transition countries’ restructuring 
and privatization efforts in many of important infrastructure sectors and their adoption of 
IRAs as regulatory institutions as it has done in other developing and emerging 
economies. 
Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s the prospect of 
EU membership became the main driving force for the adoption of regulatory institutions 
such as IRAs for the CEE countries. One of the pre-conditions for admission into the EU 
is the full harmonization of political, legal, and regulatory practices. Thus, CEE countries 
started to adopt EU’s acquis communautaire immediately after achieiving candidate 
status. IRAs in infrastructure sectors were becoming a norm in the member countries and 
hence, were in most cases directly mandated by the EU for the accession countries. 
The EU used the PHARE program as a pre-accession instrument to help CEE 
countries prepare for joining the EU. The program was originally created in 1989 to 
                                                 
16 By the end of 1994, 25 transition countries were members of IMF, all except Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania having joined within the five years that passed since 1989. See, “Supporting Transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe: An Assessment and Lessons from the IMF's Five Years' Experience”, Second Annual 
Francisco Fernández Ordóñez Address by Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, Madrid, 
December 21, 1994 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/mds/1995/mds9502.htm). 
 
17 See the relevant country pages available at IMF website that posts various documents, including letters of 
intent, on the country’s relations with IMF (http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm).  20
provide assistance to Poland and Hungary.
18 It was then extended to cover the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania as well 
as Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
19 As 
early as 1993, support provided through the PHARE program was reoriented to include a 
substantial increase of support for infrastructure investment. The PHARE program was 
thus the main conduit for the EU-led propagation of IRAs into CEE countries.
20  
  Table 4 (see Appendix) presents a list of regulators in what are called South 
Eastern European (SEE) countries. Among these, Bulgaria and Romania are about to 
complete membership negotiations and will become full members of the EU, while 
Crotia has been given a date to formally start accession negotiations. Compared to the 
economies of CEE countries, the economies of SEE countries have lagged behind in 
restructuring their economies (some partly due to extended armed conflict they have been 
involved with their neighbors). Letters of intent submitted to the IMF show that for 
certain countries, e.g. for Bulgaria early on), the IMF made restructuring of certain 
sectors a precondition for extending further loans.
21 Similar to its programs in other 
countries, such as Latvia,  the World Bank has included restructuring, privatization, and 
the establishment of a regulatory framework for utilities as conditions for lending to SEE 
countries, such as Croatia. 
  Bjork and Connors hold that the EU champions the creation of regulatory bodies 
not only in countries seeking membership, but also even in countries “with no desire to 
join the club, but with which it does business.” (2005: 54) Among such countries, Russia 
has been the one to which not only the EU, but also international financial institutions, 
such as the IMF, have, thus far, not been able to effectively diffuse their prescribed 
organizational forms. Unlike in Asian countries where IRAs were relatively rapidly 
established after the financial crises of the 1990s, in Russia, the impact of the 1998 
                                                 
18 For an overview of PHARE and related programs, see the EU webpage at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/intro.htm. 
19 In 2001, CARDS program (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development, and Stability in the 
Balkans) was initiated and Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
was moved from the PHARE program to the CARDS program. 
20 A stated aim of the PHARE program is “Strengthening public administrations and instutions to function 
effectively inside the European Union”. (http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/pas/phare/intro.htm). 
21 See the relevant country pages available at (http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm). 
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financial crisis did not go much beyond generating general and largely unfulfilled 
statements (also included in te country’s memoranda to the IMF) about improving the 
regulatory framework. Somewhat like China,  Russia’a aspirations to join the WTO may 
catalyze the reform process as membership entails the obligated transfer of organizational 
norms and policies. Nevertheless, the fact that China has not yet gone further than 
establishing separate, but not independent regulatory commissions, may reveal the 
difficulties and limits involved in diffusing IRAs into large and powerful post-
communists countries resisting rapid political transformation. 
 
III. Diffusion of IRAs: The Case of Turkey 
 
Background and Overview 
After a prolonged period of economic and political turmoil in the second half of 1970s, 
Turkey set on a course of market-oriented reforms at the end of 1979, which was a 
fundamental break with the country’s étatist past.
22 Reform of the trade regime stood at 
the core of the reform program. This involved commitment to a more flexible exchange 
rate policy and abandoning of import substitution policies through promotion of exports 
as well as liberalization of imports. Another main objective of the 1980 reform was to 
reduce the size of the public sector and to allow more freedom to private initiative and 
markets in determining resource allocation in the economy. Privatization of state-owned 
enterprises and liberalization of financial markets were conceived as two very important 
aspects of this process.
23 
The 1980 reforms brought about profound changes in the incentive structure 
economic actors faced and in the way they did business. This was the case especially for 
the Turkish manufacturing industry, which had to go through a fundamental reorientation 
after decades of protection under import substitution policies. Cushioned by import 
restrictions and high tariff barriers, many sectors of the manufacturing industry had been 
highly concentrated, and state-owned enterprises had dominated many important sectors. 
                                                 
22 The military regime that seized power in 1980 at the height of the crisis continued with the reform 
program. 
23 For reviews of Turkey’s liberalization policies, see Öniş and Riedel (1993), Togan (1994), and Togan 
and Balasubramanyam (1996).  22
Export promotion policies created a new set of incentives for the manufacturing industry, 
and the share of manufacturing in exports has dramatically increased within a rather short 
period of time. 
One would have expected that more liberal import policies and export orientation 
of the 1980s would bring about a profound transformation for all aspects of the Turkish 
industrial structure. However, in two important aspects the conditions in most Turkish 
industrial sectors have not exhibited considerable improvement. Firstly, monopolization 
and high concentration in the Turkish manufacturing industries persisted.
24 Secondly, the 
process of privatizing state-owned firms, which was a stated aim of the reform program 
of 1980, started in 1986 but has not made headway up until very recently. The 
privatization experience of Turkey can be described at best as mediocre, as restructuring 
of most of the utility-like sectors, such as telecommunications and electricity, with large 
state-owned firms has not yet been fully accomplished.
25 
It can be argued that Turkey's meagre performance in terms of restructuring its 
manufacturing industry and privatization largely draws from its failure to institute and 
implement an effective regulatory framework, including a well functioning competition 
policy. A regulatory framework to oversee the industries that are likely to remain 
imperfectly competitive after privatization was not thought of before hand for most of the 
industries. 
The importance of instituting a regulatory framework prior to liberalization and 
privatization of industries has finally been realized and legislation has been passed to this 
effect only towards the end of 1990s. This, however, only came after years of stagnant 
economic conditions and only in the aftermath of the Southeast Asian and the Russian 
crises of 1997 and 1998 that exacerbated some of the very important structural problems 
the Turkish economy had failed to address. 
One of the key sectors in need of significant restructuring was the Turkish 
banking industry. Turkish banking industry had been ailing all throughout the 1990s, 
                                                 
24 See Katırcıoğlu et al. (1995), Yalçın (2000), and Metin-Özcan et al. (2000).  Note that high concentration 
ratios may say very little about the industry structure in an open economy as long as international 
competition limits any domestic power. However, evidence available on the disciplining role of imports for 
the Turkish manufacturing industry is weak and very limited. Levinsohn (1993) tests the imports-as-
market-discipline hypothesis using Turkish data for the 1983-1986 period, and provides some weak 
evidence supporting the hypothesis for a small number of industries. 
25 For a detailed review of Turkey’s privatization experience between 1986 and 1998, see Karataş (2001).  23
primarily due to distorted incentives it faced in the chronically high and erratic 
inflationary environment, which went together with increasing government deficits. 
Excessive and persistent public sector borrowing requirements led to very high real 
returns in government issued securities that allowed some private banks to accumulate 
asset portfolios that were far from sound. Together with the slackening of entry 
requirements to the sector and the overall weakness of the regulatory framework, this 
environment contributed to the fragmentation of the banking sector into small banks. A 
significant number of small banks carrying weak asset portfolios became insolvent over 
time and had to be transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), which at 
the time was being managed by the Turkish Central Bank.
26 
The banking sector crisis was apparent by 1997 and a sweeping restructuring of 
the banking sector was demanded by both IMF and the World Bank as a precondition for 
extension of further loans. The restructuring of the regulatory framework in the banking 
industry started in 1999 with a new banking law that mandated the creation of an 
independent regulatory agency for the banking sector. The restructuring process was 
certainly a very painful one and it was further exacerbated by two very severe banking 
crises, namely those of November 2000 and February 2001. These crises caught the 
Turkish banking sector in the middle of a sweeping restructuring process, which was one 
of the critical components of the comprehensive disinflation program Turkey adopted at 
the beginning of 2000 under the tutelage of the IMF. 
The disinflation program of 2000 with the IMF involved tight fiscal and monetary 
policies, large-scale structural reforms, and a pre-determined exchange rate policy to 
serve as a nominal anchor in reducing inflation from its chronically high levels. 
Regarding the banking sector, it foresaw revamping of the legal and regulatory 
framework for banking supervision in accordance with the EU and world standards, 
correcting the weaknesses in the private banking system, and restructuring and the 
ultimately privatization of the state banks. Towards this end, the powers of the 
independent Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA), which was 
established as part of a new banking law in 1999, were further strengthened through a 
                                                 
26 SDIF was established in 1983. The Turkish Central Bank had managed SDIF from its inception until  
2000, at which time it was transferred to the then newly founded regulatory agency for the banking industry 
(see below).  24
series of amendments approved in the Parliament in December 1999. As the single 
regulatory and supervisory agency to oversee the sector, BRSA was given independent 
jurisdiction over the entry and exit of banks and over changes to the regulatory 
framework. 
The establishment of BRSA marked the onset of a wave of new IRAs in a number 
of industries. BRSA started its operations in 2000. Also in 2000, a new act to liberalize 
the telecommunications sector was enacted and an IRA was established to regulate the 
industry. Finally, two different acts were enacted for the liberalization of electricity and 
natural gas industries in 2001, and an IRA was established to oversee the performance of 
both of these industries. In the unusual sector of agriculture for IRAs, an IRA to regulate 
the sugar industry was created in 2001 and another for the tobacco industry was created 
in 2002. Finally, an IRA for regulating and overseeing all public procurement activities 
was created also in 2002. 
The correlation between the IMF and World Bank sponsored programs amidst a 
series of economic crises Turkey went through at the end of 1990s and the creation of 
IRAs is clearly apparent. For example, in the Letter of Intent submitted by the Turkish 
governments to IMF in December 1999 as part of a standby agreement, Turkish 
government officially undertook to strengthen the independence of BRSA, which had 
been set up earlier in the year at the urging of the IMF.
27 Similarly, IRAs for the 
electricity, natural gas as well as telecommunication sectors were put in writing as part of 
a as part of a credit agreement with the World Bank in 2000. Establishing of an IRA for 
the electricity sector was also explicitly promised in the Letter of Intent submitted to the 
IMF in December 2000.
28 
An equally important external factor that contributed to the wave of IRAs in 
Turkey is its accession process to the EU. As part of this process that has aimed the 
starting of negotiations for full membership, Turkey has undertaken to reform its 
                                                 
27 The Letter of Intend, dated December 19, 1999, is posted at 
http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/sb_english.htm (see the Strengthening the banking system and banking 
regulation section for the pledge regarding BRSA). 
28 See the Telecommunications Reform and the Energy Reform sections of the Letter of Development 
Policy submitted by the Turkish Government to World Bank 2000 
(http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/erl_ldp_ing.htm). The Letter of Intend, dated December 18, 2000, is 
posted at http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/mektup/mektup-en.htm (see the Privatization section for the 
official promise regarding an independent electricity regulator).  25
administrative system in line with the rules and regulations of the EU. For reasons of its 
own, the EU has witnessed proliferation of IRAs in different sectors within its member 
states, and the establishment of IRAs was strongly encouraged and in some cases 
stipulated as a precondition for all accession countries. In the case of Turkey, this was not 
only a contributing factor for the proliferation of IRAs after 1999, but also a key factor 
for the enactment of a competition law and the establishment of a competition authority 




There are currently nine public entities in Turkey that concur with a broad definition for 
IRAs.
30 In the order of their date of establishment, these are Capital Markets Board 
(1981), The Higher Board for Radio and Television (1994), Competition Agency (1994), 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (1999), Telecommunications Agency (2000), 
Energy Markets Regulatory Agency (2001), Sugar Agency (2001), Tobacco, Tobacco 
Products, and Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency (2002), and Public 
Procurement Agency (2002). Table 5 (see Appendix) presents certain details about the 
structure of Turkish IRAs, including information on their statutory independence and 
accountability. 
 
The Creation of Turkey’s First Agency: Pre-1990 Period 
 
Capital Market Board (CMB) 
CMB is the first public body that was established in Turkey with the broad traits of a 
bona fide IRA. It was established in 1981 in conjunction with the enactment of Capital 
Market Law No. 2499, which provided the legal framework for the establishment of an 
official capital market. CMB was given the task of establishing and developing capital 
markets and instituting an effective regulatory framework that would protect the rights all 
investors and other parties involved. It was established as a public legal entity in its own 
                                                 
29 For extensive overviews of IRAs in Turkey, see TÜSİAD (2002), Sönmez (2004). For international 
comparisons among IRAs in various developed and other countries, see Zenginobuz (2002a), and for a 
study attempting a comparative assessment of Turkish IRAs, see Zenginobuz (2002b). 
30 See Footnote 2 for minimum requirements to qualify as an IRA.  26
right and given the authority to make decisions independently. However, in the terms of 
Turkish administrative law, it was a body “related” to the Ministry of Finance.
31 A 
consequence of CMB’s related status was to carry out inspections of entities that operated 
in capital markets, if and when requested by the Ministry of Finance. It could take action 
against infringements of the law and impose sanctions on entities involved only with the 
approval of Ministry.  
CMB has seven members who were appointed for six years by the Council of 
Ministers. Initially, three of the Board members were chosen among six nominees by the 
Ministry of Finance, and one each out of each two nominees by Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Trade, Central Bank, and Union of Turkish Banks. 
The considerable power of control exercised by the Ministry of Finance over the 
operations of CMB was ended through two extensive amendments of Capital Market 
Law No. 2499 that were enacted in 1992 and 1999.
32 With these changes CMB became 
the sole authority with the power to regulate, supervise, and sanction in the capital 
market. Hence, it would be fair to say that CMB became a bona fide IRA only in 1999. 
CMB is now “affiliated” with a Ministry of State within the Prime Ministry instead of 








                                                 
31 According to Turkish Constitution, Turkish administrative structure is unitary in nature in the sense that 
the executive branch is to be considered as constituting a whole in relation to all central and other 
(decentralized) administrative units constituting the state. Therefore, a strict indivisibility of administration 
is envisaged, and even the agencies with separate public legal personality are considered as being under the 
tutelage control of the center (Sönmez, 2004; 179). In the case of an agencies created with their own public 
legal personality, the indivisibility of administration is established by “relating” the agency to a (related) 
Ministry. The status of relatedness constitutes an obvious violation of notion of independence for an IRA. 
To get around this issue the IRA’s that are established later were declared as being “affiliated” to a 
Ministry rather than being related to it (see below). This was a creative piece of lawmaking as there is no 
previous mention of this notion in the Turkish administrative law. In fact, critics argue that the Turkish 
Constitution does not allow room for such a notion. See Tan (2000) for a discussion of the place of IRAs in 
Turkish administrative law. 
32 The Law No. 3749 of 1992 and the Law No. 4487 of 1999. 
33 See Footnote 15 for brief information on the notions of a “related” agency and “affiliated” agency.  27
Acceleration of Diffusion: 1990-1999 Period 
 
The Higher Board for Radio and Television (HBRT) 
HBRT was established in 1994 as a regulatory body following the ending of state 
monopoly in radio and television broadcasting in 1993.
34 HBRT was created as an 
independent body with its own public legal personality to regulate, oversee, and sanction 
all entities involved in broadcasting. Its powers extend over technical aspects of 
broadcasting (such as frequency plannning) as well as regulation of competition in the 
broadcasting market. Moreover, HBRT is responsible for overseeing the content of 
material broadcasting and has the power to sanction against illegal and “immoral” content 
(ranging from temporary shutting down of stations to cancellation of broadcasting 
licenses). The procedure for nominating as well as appointing the nine Board members 
went through a number of changes, but in all cases both of these functions have been 
carried out by the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
 
Competition Agency (CA) 
CA is the body responsible for implementing Turkish Competition Law, which was 
enacted in 1994.
35 Competition Board, the decision making organ of CA responsible for 
the enforcement of Competition Law, was not appointed until February 1997 and finally 
began its operations in November 1997. Competition Board comprises of 11 members. 
Various ministries and other governmental and non-governmental bodies nominate two 
candidates for each position and the Council of Ministers appoints one out of each two 
nominees as a member for a term of six years. 
Competition Law grants full financial and administrative autonomy to CA. That 
is, CA is an ‘‘independent administrative authority’’, and as such it is not subject to 
instructions and orders of any other governmental body, including the Council of 
Ministers that appoints the members of Competition Board. 
Competition Board has been granted extensive powers of examination and 
investigation regarding issues that pertain to the infringement of Competition Law. It can 
                                                 
34 The Law No. 3984 of 1994. The Law No. 2709 of 1993 involved the constitutional amendment of the 
Article 133 of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic. 
35 Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition of 1994.  28
act upon a notification or a complaint by any concerned party, by the request of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, and upon its own initiative. CA has to be consulted 
regarding any changes in the legislation concerning competition policies.
36 Basic means 
that the Competition Board is empowered with in implementing Competition Law are the 
authority to request information from related parties and on-the-spot examination 
(Articles 14 and 15). The Law also empowers the Board to levy fines (Articles 16 and 
17). Competition Board’s decisions can be appealed to the Council of State. 
The enactment of the Competition Law and the establishment of CA have largely 
been due to Turkey's obligation under the Association Agreement between Turkey and 
the European Economic Community, the European Union (EU) as formerly called, to 
enact and implement a competition policy.
37 The Association Agreement requires that the 
parties should apply the provisions of Rome Treaty for the harmonization of their laws, 
tax rules, and competition policies. Pursuant to the agreement reached at the Association 
Council meeting of March 1995, Turkey and EU finally created a customs union starting 
January 1, 1996.
38 This agreement required that Turkey undertook all necessary measures 
to enact and effectively implement the competition law and policies of EU. Thus, 
enactment of Turkish Competition Law was a prelude on Turkey’s part to the signing of 
the customs union agreement with EU.  The lag between enactment of Competition Law 
and its enforcement is to a large extent a reflection of the ambivalence on the part of both 
Turkey and the EU regarding Turkey’s accession to EU and the stop-and-go nature of the 




                                                 
36 To this end, a memorandum issued in 1998 by the Prime Ministry General Directorate of Personnel and 
Principles instructed all ministries to receive the opinion of CA about draft laws, by-laws, regulations and 
communiqués regarding issues that fall under the scope of Competition Law.  However, compliance with 
this memorandum has been wanting, as it has been observed that for various regulations the opinion of 
Competition Authority was either not asked at all or asked at the last stage of regulation develepoment 
process (for example, the Sugar Act and the Telecom Act, both enacted in 2001).  The said memorandum 
had to be reissued in 2001. 
37 The Association Agreement was signed in Ankara on September 12, 1963 and became effective on 
December 1, 1964. 
38 Decision No. 1/95 of the Association Council.  29
The Proliferation of IRAs: From 1999 to the Present 
 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) 
BRSA was established in June 1999 in conjunction with the enactment of Law of Banking 
No. 4389 that brought about significant restructuring of the Turkish banking industry. 
There was no official standby agreement with IMF at the time, but both the passing of the 
new banking law as well as the establishment of BRSA were to a large extent carried out 
under the urging as well as guidance of IMF. When Turkey finally signed a standby 
agreement with IMF in December 1999, an official pledge to further broaden BRSA’s 
mandate, to amend its independence status as well as to enhance the transparency of its 
operations were put in writing in the associated letter of intent.
39 Several acts of law were 
then passed between 1999 and 2002 to amend various clauses of Law of Banking No. 
4389 to carry out these promises.
40 
  BRSA has a Board in charge of its operations and it consists of seven members. 
With the last set of amendments, all of the BRSA Board members are appointed directly 
by the Council of Ministers according. In fact, the Council of Ministers also directly 
appoints the head of the agency and his deputy (see Table ? for some details of the 
current structure of BRSA). 
Various acts of law amending previous legislation regarding BRSA constitue a 
very interesting case study for the evolution of IRAs in the context of an emerging 
economy. As per the stipulations of Law of Banking No. 4389, the members of BRSA 
were initially appointed for a period of six years in 1999. However, the Law No. 4672 of 
May 2001 that amended Law of Banking No. 4389 contained a stipulation terminating the 
terms of the existing members, thereby allowing the government to appoint a completely 
new set of members
41 The head of BRSA who was elected by the new Board was later 
                                                 
39 See the Strengthening the banking system and banking regulation section of the letter of intent dated 
December 19, 1999, submitted to IMF (http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/sb_english). 
40 The Law No. 4491 of December 1999, the Law No. 4672 of May 2001, and the Law No. 4743 of January 
2002 all contained amendments to Law of Banking No. 4389.  
41 Though the crisis of February 2001 did not bring down the coalition government that had been in power 
since 1999, Kemal Derviş, a Turkish citizen and a former associate of the then Prime Minister Bülent 
Ecevit, was summoned from its World Bank position in Washington D.C. by Bülent Ecevit himself to take 
charge of the Turkish economy that was on the verge of a complete breakdown. He was appointed as the 
Minister of State in charge of the economy. In complete contradiction of the law that created it, BRSA was 
put under the charge of Kemal Derviş, and Zekeriya Temizel, who was the first Head of BRSA, resigned  30
forced to resign in November of 2003 by the current one-party government that came to 
power after the general election of November 2002. 
 
Telecommunications Agency (TA) 
TA was established in 2000 through the enactmentof the Law No. 4502 and it started its 
operations within the same year. Its Board, which is in charge of running its operations, 
consists of five members.  
The establishment of TA as an IRA in charge of regulating the Turkish 
telecommunication industry followed an official undertaking by the Turkish government 
to privatize its state-owned monopoly telecommunications operator and liberalize its 
telecommunications market as part of a credit agreement with the World Bank in 2000.
42 
Previously, regulatory powers in the telecommunications industry were partly exercised 
by the Ministry of Transportation and partly by Türk Telekomünikasyon A.Ş., the state-
owned monopoly operator. 
 
Energy Markets Regulatory Agency (EMRA) 
As in the case telecommunications sector, the establishment of IRAs for the electricity 
and natural gas (energy) sectors was part of an official pledge made by the Turkish 
government to restructure and liberalize its electricity market in a credit agreement signed 
with the World Bank in 2000.
43 Initially, a separate IRA for the electricity market, 
Electricity Market Regulation Agency, was created by the Electricity Market Law No. 
4628 in February 2001 to regulate the electricity sector. However, before its Board 
members were appointed, it was transformed into a joint regulator for the energy sector 
as a whole and named Energy Markets Regulatory Agency in April 2000 with the 
enactment of Law No. 4646 on the regulation of natural gas market. Its Board, consisting 
                                                                                                                                                 
immediately in protest. For a certain period of time, Kemal Derviş exercised almost complete control over 
all economic decisions taken by the government and the termination of the terms of the initial set of BRSA 
Board members is seen largely as his undertaking. The operation aimed at appointing a new head for BRSA 
who was more “market friendly” than Zekeriya Temizel. Engin Akçakoca, who quit a top position in a 
private bank to become a Board member, was appointed as the head for the BRSA in March of 2001. 
42 See the Telecommunications Reform section of the Letter of Development Policy submitted by the 
Turkish Government to World Bank 2000 (http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/erl_ldp_ing.htm). 
43 See the Energy Reform section of the Letter of Development Policy submitted by the Turkish 
Government to World Bank 2000 (http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/erl_ldp_ing.htm).  31
of seven members, was appointed soon after and EMRA became operational in 
November 2001. EMRA is now the sole authority responsible from regulation and 
supervision of all energy markets in Turkey. Previously the Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources was the body that carried out these tasks. 
 
An Oddity: Two IRAs in the Agriculture Sector 
 
Turkey stands out as a special case where two IRAs were created two regulate 
agricultural markets. Sugar beet and tobacco are two important crops for the Turkish 
agriculture industry. A large number of farmers and their families in different parts of 
Turkey earn their living through production of these crops. Agricultural support policies 
that Turkish governments have traditionally undertaken with a view to securing votes in 
elections are largely seen as a very important contributor to the mounting public debt. 
Consequently, IMF and the World Bank have both stipulated replacement of distortive 
price supports in the agricultural sector with direct cash support to farmers. They also 
demanded serious reforms for the sector, including privatization of the state-owned sugar 
and tobacco production facilities. 
In a series of letters of intent signed as part of standby agreements, Turkish 
government has indeed promised to do away with price supports for sugar beet and 
tobacco and privatize the state-owned sugar and tobacco factories with the aim of 
liberalizing these markets.
44 There is, however, no mention of establishing IRAs for these 
sectors in the letters of intent. The creation of IRAs to regulate the markets for these two 
important crops seems to have aimed at compensating for the discontinuation of the 
state’s direct presence in these two markets where the livelihood of a large number of 
families have depended for a very long time on subsidies through price supports. In this 
regard, it looks more like the choice of the Turkish government itself rather than an 
imposition by IMF or the World Bank. 
                                                 
44 Structural reform sections of letters of intent dated December 18, 2000; January 30, 2001; May 3, 2001; 
June 26, 2001; July 31,2001; January 18, 2002; April 3, 2002; and June 19,2002 all refer explicitly to the 
need for support policy reform for these crops and to privatizing state-owned production facilities involving 
these crops (all letters are available at http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/imf_standbyeng.htm).  32
The overall structure and certain aspects of agricultural IRAs are markedly 
different than the IRAs established for non-agricultural sectors, with less independence 
from government’s influence in terms of decision-making and financial matters.
45 
Moreover, the law that established an IRA to regulate the sugar market contains a sunset 
clause granting discretion to terminate the activities of the agency at the end of 2004. The 
implied temporariness of the agency may very well be at the urging of IMF and World 
Bank and may have emerged as the outcome of negotiations between the two sides.
46 On 
the other hand, rather interestingly, there was no such sunset clause for the agency 
created to regulate the tobacco market. 
  
Sugar Agency (SA) 
SA was established in 2001 by the Law No. 4634 and started its operations in the same 
year. Its Board consists of seven members, appointed by the Council of Ministers from 
among nominations by various Ministries, sugar producers’ cooperatives and private 
sugar product manufacturers.  
In contrast to other IRAs, the Board members for SA are allowed to continue with 
their existing jobs (their Board membership is terminated if they leave their current 
positions that was earmarked for the entity nominating them). In fact, most of the 
members appointed for the Board were state employees in other state offices and 
continued with their work in their primary positions during their tenure at SA. 
Another interesting aspect of the structure of SA is the conditional sunset clause 
in the Law No. 4634. The clause stipulated that SA may be discontinued at the end of 
2004 unless otherwise mandated by a decree of the Council of Ministers. In fact, the 
current government let the sunset clause become effective at the end of 2004 and, 
therefore, SA is currently extinct.
47 
 
                                                 
45 See the low statutory independence scores calculated by Zenginobuz (2002b: Table 7) for the agricultural 
IRAs in comparison to the other Turkish IRAs. 
46 Ajay Chibber, the Head of World Bank Office in Turkey at the time, was quoted in a Turkish newspaper 
to state that the IRAs for the sugar and tobacco markets were transitory agencies (Hürriyet, February, 17, 
2002, cited in Emek (2002, page 157).  
47 However, the terms of the Board members were extended for a period of two years. It is not clear what 
they will be compensated for as the Board as well as other operational units of SA are now officially 
disbanded.  33
Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency 
(TTAMRA) 
TTAMRA was established in 2002 by the Law No. 4773 and given the mandate to 
regulate and supervise the tobacco, tobacco products, and alcoholic beverages markets. In 
addition, TTAMRA was also assigned to provide social regulation in the sense of 
developing and implementing policies to reduce consumption of the goods under its 
mandate. 
As in the case of SA, the Board of TTAMRA consists of seven members, all 
appointed by the Council of Ministers and the Board members for TTAMRA are allowed 
to continue with their existing jobs. However, interestingly enough, there is no sunset 
clause for TTAMRA in Law No. 4773 that established it. 
 
The Last Addition -  Thus Far 
 
Public Procurement Agency (PPA) 
PPA was established by the Public Procurement Law No. 4734 that was enacted in 2002 
and it started its operations in the same year. Its Board consists of ten members.
48 Its 
main tasks include serving as a complaints office in all matters related to public 
procurement for all affected parties; developing and enacting all secondary regulations 
related to public procurement as well as designing and developing the form and content 
of contracts to be signed among parties.  
A main impetus behind the establishment of PPA as an IRA was an initiative of 
the European Commission that urged member and accession countries to adopt a well-
designed procurement policy and to institute a separate agency in charge of regulating 
and supervising all public procurement activities (89/665/EEC). A public procurement 
policy that does not discriminate against participants from other member states and a 
completely impartial enactment of it in a transparent manner were seen by the European 
Commission as vital for the prevention of uncompetitive practices in public procurement, 
an area that is notoriously open to rent seeking behavior by private parties as well as 
politicians and government officials. 
                                                 
48 The even number of the Board members is a curious oddity.  34
Establishing an independent agency for public procurement practices was also an 
issue negotiated within standby agreements between Turkish governments and IMF. 
Several letters of intent referred to Turkey’s promise to set up an IRA for public 
procurement.
49 
Note that the European Commission did not explicitly require an IRA in the area 
of public procurement but a separate agency with a clear mandate and well defined 
procedures for appealing its decisions. It also required that the board members of the 
public procurement agency should have well defined tenures and effective immunity 
from unreasonable termination of their terms by the executive branch of government. Full 
independence of the agency was an issue that arose in the standby agreements with IMF. 
  
The Turkish Experience with IRAs: Mechanisms of Diffusion and Beyond 
The proliferation of IRAs in Turkey in the 1990s and 2000s, rather than in the 1980s, 
when Turkey had already strated on a course of liberalization, clearly reveals the 
“interdependent” nature of its decisions to create IRAs. Except for instituting the Capital 
Markets Board, as a semi-independent agency mandated to develop, regulate, or 
supervise capital markets, in 1981, Turkey paid little or no attention to establishing an 
effective regulatory framework in the 1980s. A closer look at the dynamics of IRA 
creation in the country in the decades that followed provides a context to analyze the 
mechanism of diffusion at work. 
  As a country at the crossroads of IMF, World Bank, and EU influence, Turkey’s 
addition of IRAs to its institutional structure can be explained, to a significant extent, by 
international coercion of various forms. First of all, Turkey showed its intention to be a 
part of the European integration project as early as 1963, when it signed an association 
agreement with the then European Economic Community. Pursuing that trajectory, the 
signing of a customs union agreement with the EU in 1995 (effective as of January 1, 
1996) required Turkey to enact and effectively implement the competition law and 
policies of the EU. The creation of one of Turkey’s earliest IRAs, namely, the 
Competition Agency, was, thus, a consequence of a process that was voluntarily initiated 
                                                 
49 See letters intent dated May 3, 2001; January 18, 2002; and April 3, 2002 (all available at 
http://www.hazine.gov.tr/standby/imf_standbyeng.htm). 
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by Turkey to be a member of the society of European states and that obligated Turkey, by 
formal agreements, to conform to the policies and organizational forms institutionalized 
in that society. Although several blueprints for a competition authority had been 
developed and discussed in Turkey since the 1970s, a competition law establishing the 
Competition Agency (CA), as an IRA, could be passed in 1994. In addition to the failure 
of early efforts to bear fruit, the time lag between the passing of this law and its actual 
enforcement in 1997 makes one suspect whether domestic political dynamics would have 
allowed making the CA operational even at that time if it had not been for the formation 
of a customs union with the EU. 
One explanation for Turkey’s inability to independently make the CA operational 
might be the absence of a domestic consensus around what kind of competition policy 
and market-supporting institutions to adopt, even though it was understood by all 
domestic players involved that a well-functioning competition policy was the essential 
component of a market economy. The signing of the customs union agreement resolved 
this disagreement by making the introduction and implementation of EU practices in this 
area a “concrete necessity”. 
The period during which IRAs became more familiar entities in the Turkish polity 
has also been the time of financial crises in emerging economies and the time after 
Turkey acquired “candidate” status for the EU.
50 As our analysis above indicates, the 
IMF and the World Bank upgraded their coercive pressures to include the creation of 
IRAs on Turkey after 1999. The IMF, first, urged and guided the establishment of the 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and then, included increasing the coverage 
of its mandate as well as its independence and transparency as a condition in its 
December 1999 standby agreement with Turkey. The Fund has also been a significant 
influence in the creation of an IRA for public procurement in 2002. It was originally the 
European Commission that demanded the adoption of a well-designed procurement 
policy and foundation of a separate agency. Yet, the Commission did not explicitly 
require an “independent” regulatory agency in this area. It was the IMF that pressed 
Turkey for the creation of such an agency by integrating it in its standby agreement with 
                                                 
50 It was at the December 1999 Helsinki Summit that the EU recognized Turkey as an EU candidate 
country on an equal footing with other candidate countries.  36
Turkey. As it has done in many other developing and emerging economies, the World 
Bank has concentrated on the privatization and regulation of utilities/infrastructure 
sectors, particularly telecommunications and energy in Turkey. The institution of IRAs in 
these sectors were included in Turkey’s credit agreements with the Bank. In sum, direct 
coercion through conditionality has evidently been a mechanism in the diffusion of IRAs 
in the country. 
Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic and somewhat inaccurate to conclude that 
the establishment of IRAs in the Turkish context was totally dictated by the IMF, the 
World Bank, and the EU, as diffusers of policies and organizational forms. Turkey, like 
many emerging markets in Latin America and Asia, had experienced not only the failure 
of old models and policies to prevent economic crises, but also the adverse effects of 
liberalization without adequate regulation. In each crisis, the IMF and World Bank 
assistance was sought and each time, the country was exposed to considerable amount of 
international coercion in the form of conditionality. Although it has to be further 
documented by more in-depth research, there is sufficient evidence to support the 
argument that some of those conditions were voluntarily accepted by Turkish 
governments that had not been able to surmount domestic collective action problems in 
designing and introducing policy and institutional reforms, as it had been the case in the 
area of competition. Such voluntarism was driven by the perceived (or real) necessity of 
introducing reforms to achieve economic stability and growth as well as to enhance 
credibility and competitiveness in international markets. 
On the other hand, regardless of whether they have actually internalized the 
creation of IRAs as “best” practice or not, the Turkish decision makers have realized that 
IRAs could provide solutions for problems peculiar to the country’s own markets. For 
instance, while the IMF and the World Bank demanded Turkey to liberalize its sugar beet 
and tobacco markets, they did not require the creation of regulatory agencies in these 
sectors. The establishment of the Sugar Agency and the Tobacco, Tobacco Products, and 
Alcoholic Beverages Markets Regulation Agency was a purely creative initiative by the 
Turkish government, reluctant to totally give up its presence and control in these sectors 
since the livelihood of millions of Turkish farmers depends on sugar beet and tobacco 
production. The World Bank’s preference to see these two IRAs as transitory agencies,  37
the law establishing only one of which includes a conditional sunset clause, shows that 
these are not IRAs actually favored by international financial institutions. They are, 
rather, not-so-independent regulatory agencies which the Turkish government has created 
to introduce a new form of state involvement in agricultural markets and to mitigate the 
effects of liberalization promoted by the IMF and the World Bank. Whether this Turkish 
“oddity” can diffuse into other emerging and developing economies with similar 
concerns and problems in the liberalization of agricultural markets in the absence of 
international coercive pressures for the creation of IRAs in agricultural sectors is an issue 
that may deserve further inquiry.     
 
IV. Conclusion 
As a preliminary study of the spread of IRAs in emerging economies, one of the main 
observations of this paper is that both the number of IRAs and the frequency of their 
creation (i.e. the proximity in the timing of their creation) both within and across 
emerging economies have increased since the early 1990s. As such, the paper provides 
further evidence for interdependent behavior as the defining attribute of diffusion, in this 
case, diffusion of regulatory agencies.  
  Among various mechanisms of diffusion, international coercion in various forms 
has constituted the main focus of our analysis. One general conclusion that can be drawn 
is that especially given the variation across national political contexts, IRAs could not 
have spread at the pace which they did in emerging economies in the absence of 
international coercion. On the other hand, an examination of empirical examples 
presented in the previous sections shows that diffusion of IRAs in the countries included 
in our sample displays different degrees of coercion. For instance, while the creation of 
IRAs in banking, telecommunications, and energy in Turkey after 1999, the rapid 
proliferation of IRAs in Asian countries after the financial crises of the 1990s, and the 
establishment of most IRAs in privatized utilities/infrastructure sectors are due more to 
coercive pressures in the form of conditionality, the creation of competition IRAs in 
Turkey and most Latin American emerging economies contains a considerable degree of 
voluntarism by national governments that have earlier on realized the necessity of 
establishing effective market-supporting institutions in order to increase international  38
trade and attract foreign investors to their liberalized markets. In the latter cases, 
international coercion is supplemented, rather than replaced, by symbolic imitation. 
  In agreement with general arguments in regards to institutional change
51, crises of 
various nature, such as the debt crisis of the 1980s continuing into the 1990s and the 
financial crises of the 1990s, have acted as catalysts for the adoption of foreign 
organizational forms as well as policies in emerging economies. In urgent need for 
lending by international financial institutions, inflow of foreign capital in the form of 
credits and investments, and increase in their exports, countries affected by crises often 
did not have the ability to significantly modify conditions that were specified by 
“dominant actors”. The drastic growth in the number of IRAs in debtor emerging 
economies in the 1990s around the time regulatory reforms including the creation of 
IRAs became a part of the neoliberal agenda and started to be incorporated into the IMF-
sponsored programs and World Bank-supported projects as conditionality cannot be a 
mere coincidence.  
Similarly the proliferation of IRAs in all CEE countries that sought to join the EU 
as soon as possible reveals the significant impact of external coercion on the diffusion of 
policies and organizational forms. This is not an anathema to the nature of the EU which 
sees itself as a diffuser of norms and practices in many issue areas. However, since there 
is no universal consensus on the form of regulation and the desirable degree of 
independence of regulatory agencies among the members of the EU, regulatory agencies 
created, under its watch, in CEE countries have different structures and degrees of 
autonomy and independence. The European Commission’s urging of all member and 
accession countries to establish a separate agency in charge of regulating and supervising 
all public procurement activities, but not going as far as demanding the creation of an 
“independent” agency is a case in point.  
In addition to the use of “conditionality” as a coercive instrument, the imposition 
of soft coercion by “dominant actors” through technical assistance, training, and informal 
meetings and conferences also emerges as a relevant mechanism of diffusion. There is 
clearly an effort to spread what are considered to be “best” practices. Establishment of a 
                                                 
51 See, for instance, Krasner (1984). 
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sound regulatory framework including the creation of IRAs is among those practices. The 
presence of like-minded technocrats in some emerging economies do not necessarily 
alleviate the coercion involved as these technocrats are mostly those formerly educated 
and trained in the institutions of economically advanced countries that are promoting and 
institutionalizing these practices under the umbrella of international organizations. The 
involvement of these organizations in debtor countries empowers such individuals as well 
as domestic groups that advocate similar policy and institutional reforms not only by 
providing them resources, but also by framing their shared ideas as the only alternatives 
with authoritative claim. The latter has become much easier to accomplish after the 
collapse of communist economies and the Asian financial crisis that shook the 
foundations of the Asian developmental state.  
Levi-Faur argues that even when they are clearly evident, pressures from external 
actors, such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the EC, “do not necessarily contradict the 
notion of learning”. (2003: 711) In our study, we also find some evidence that “learning” 
may also be a relevant mechanism of diffusion. There are those who interpret the 
acceleration of liberalization and privatization in some emerging economies, such as 
India, as the culmination of a learning process. Systematically differentiating and 
examining the relevance and impact of learning on the spread of IRAs in emerging 
markets has not been one of objectives of this paper. Yet, these are questions that deserve 
in-depth and detailed qualitative case studies and comparative analyses of a smaller 


















Table 1: Regulatory Agencies in Selected Latin American Emerging Economies  
              (Economic Regulation) 
 
Country Sector  Agency  Year 
      
Argentina  Competition  Comisión Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia  1980 
  Telecommunications  Comisión Nacional de Comunicaciones  1990 
  Electricity  Ente Nacional Regulator de la Electricidad  1991 
  Gas  Ente Nacional Regulator del Gas  1992 
  Security and Exchange  Comisión Nacional de Valores  1968 
  Financial Services  Banco Central. Superintendencia de Entidades Finacieras 
y Cambiarias 
substantially reformed in 
1992 
  Water  Ente Regulator de Agua  1992 
  Post services  Comisión Nacional de Comunicaciones  1992 
      
Brazil  Competition  Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica  substantialy reformed 1994 
  Telecommunications  Agência Nacional de Telecomunicacôes  1997 
  Electricity  Agência Nacional de Energia Electrica   1996 
  Gas  Agência Nacional del Petroleo   1997 
  Security and Exchange  Comissao de Valores Mobilários   substantially reformed 2002 
  Water  Agencia Nacional de Aguas A  2000 
        
Chile  Competition  Fiscalía Nacional Económica   substantially reformed 1980 
  Telecommunications  Subsecretaria de Telecomunicaciones   1977 
  Electricity  Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles  1985 
  Gas  Superintendencia de Electricidad y Combustibles   1985 
  Security and Exchange  Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros   1980 
  Financial services  Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras   1975 
  Water  Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios   1990 
      
Colombia  Competition  Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio   1992 
  Telecommunications  Comisión de Regulación de Telecomunicaciones   1994 
  Electricity  Comisión de Regulación de Energia y Gas   1994 
  Gas  Comisión de Regulación de Energia y Gas   1994 
  Security and exchange  Superintendencia de Valores Supervalor   1979 
  Financial services  Superintendencia Bancaria Superbanca   1923 
  Water  Comisión de regulación de Agua Potable y Saneamiento 
Bási 
1994 
      
Mexico  Competition  Comisión Federal de Competencia   1992 
  Telecommunications  Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones   1995 
  Electricity  Comisión Reguladora de Energia   1995 
  Gas  Comisión Reguladora de Energia   1995 
  Security and exchange  Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores   substantially reformed 1995 
  Financial services  Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores   substantially reformed 1995 
  Water  Comisión Nacional del Agua   1989  41
Table 1 (continued): Regulatory Agencies in Selected Latin American Emerging Economies  
                         (Economic Regulation) 
 
Peru  Competition  Instituto Nacional de defensa de la Competencia   1992 
  Telecommunications  Organismo Supervisor de Inversión Privada en 
Telecomunica  
1993 
  Electricity Organismo  Supervisor  de Inversión en Energia   1996 
  Gas  Organismo Supervisor de Inversión en Energia   2001 
  Security and exchange  Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Empresas   substantially reformed 1992 
  Financial services  Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros  substantially reformed 1981 
  Water  Superintendencia Nacional de Servicios de Saneamiento   1992 
      
Venezuela  Competition  Superintendencia para la Promoción y la Protección de la 
Libr 
1992 
  Telecommunications  Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones   1991 
  Electricity  Comisión Nacional de Energia Eléctrica   1999 
  Gas  Ente Nacional del Gas   1999 
  Security and exchange  Comisión Nacional de Valores   substantially reformed 1998 
  Financial services  Superintendencia de Bancos y Otras Instituciones   substantially reformed 1993 
  Water  Superintendencia Nacional de los Servicios de Agua   2001 
























Table 2: Regulatory Agencies in Selected Asian Emerging Economies  
              (Economic Regulation) 
 
Country Sector  Agency  Year 
India  Competition  Competition Commission of India  2002 
 
Security and 
Exchange  Securities and Exchange Board of India  1992 
  Telecommunications Telecom  Regulatory  Authority of India  1997, amended 2000 
  Electricity  Central Electricity Regulatory Commission  1998, law amended 2000 
  Ports  Tariff Authority for Major Ports  1997 
      
Indonesia  Competition  Commission for The Supervision of Business Competition   2000 
  Energy  Nuclear Energy Regulatory Agency of Indonesia   1998 
  Finance  The Financial and Development Supervisory   1983 
  Telecommunications Badan  Regulasi Telekomunikasi Indonesia   2004 
      
Malaysia  Energy Energy  Commission  2001 
 
Security and 
Exchange  Securities Commission (SC)  1993 
  Telecommunications  Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission  1998 
      
Phillippines 
Security and 
Exchange  Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission  2000 
  Energy  Energy Regulatory Commission  2001 
  Telecommunications  National Telecommunications Commission  1979 
      
S. Korea  Competition Fair  Trade  Commission  1994 
 
Banking, securities, 
insurance  Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC)  1998 
Taiwan  Competition Fair  Trade  Commission  1992 
 
Banking, Securities, 
Insurance  Financial Supervisory Commission  2004 
      
Thailand  Competition Trade  Competition  Commission  1999 
 
Security and 
Exchange  Securities and Exchange Commission  1992 
  Telecommunications  National Telecommunications Commission  2004 
      
PR of 
China  Banking  China Banking Regulatory Commission  2003 
 
Security and 
Exchange  China Securities Regulatory Commission  1998 












Table 3: Regulatory Agencies in CEE Countries (Economic Regulation) 
 
Country Sector  Agency  Year 
      
the Czech Republic  Business and commercial sectors  Office for the Protection of Competition  1996 
  Electricity, gas and heat  Energy Regulatory Office  2001 
  Commercial and foreign banks  Banking Supervision Department, Czech National Bank   1992 
  Capital markets  Czech Securities Commission  1998 
  Radio and television broadcasting  Council for Radio and Television Broadcasting  1992 
  Telecommunications Telecommunications  Office  2000 
      
Hungary  Competition  Hungarian Competition Authority   1990 
  Electricity, gas and heat  Energy Office   1994 
  All financial sectors  Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority   2000 
  Wire, radio, information technology, 
electronic signatures, postal services  Hungarian Communication Authority  1993 
      
Poland  Competition  Office for Competition and Consumer Protection   1990 
  Electricity, gas and heat  Office for Energy Regulation   1997 
  Banking  General Inspectorate of Banking Supervision   1998 
  Insurance sector, retirement pension 
funds  Insurance and Pension Funds Supervisory Office   2002 
  Public finance sector  Public Procurement Office   1995 
  Securities and Exchange   Securities Exchange Commission   1991 
  Telecommunications and post 
services  Office of Telecommunications and Post Regulation   2002 
      
Slovak Republic  Competition Antimonopoly  Office  2001 
  Electricity , gas and heat  Regulatory Office for Network Industries  2001 
  Financial sectors  Financial Market Authority (FMA)  2002 
  Telecommunications  Office of Telecommunications  2000 
      
Slovenia  Competition  Competition Protection Office  1994 
  Electricity and gas  Energy Agency of Slovenia (ERA)  2000 
  Banks, savings bank, Savings and 
Loan Undertakings  Banking Supervision Department (Bank of Slovenia)  1991 
  Insurance   Insurance Supervision Agency  2000 




















Table 4: Regulatory Agencies in SEE Countries (Economic Regulation) 
 
Country Sector  Agency  Year 
      
Albania  Electricity  Electricity Regulatory Entity   1996 
  Insurance and reinsurance activities  Insurance Supervision Commission   1996 
  Banking  Banking Supervision Department  1992 
  Telecommunication  Telecommunication Regulatory Entity   1998 
FBiH  Banking   Banking Agency   1996 
  Telecommunication  Communications Regulatory Agency   2001 
Bulgaria  Competition  Commission on Protection of 
Competition  1991 
  Electricity, heating and natural gas  State Energy Regulatory Commission   1999 
  Banks, including branches of foreign 
banks  Banking Supervision Department  1997 
  Non-banking financial sector  Financial Supervision Commission  2003 
  Radio and TV broadcasting  Council of Electronic Media  2001 
  Telecommunications, postal services  Communications Regulation Commission  2002 
Croatia  Competition  Agency for the Protection of Market 
Competition  1997 
  Electricity, gas, oil and  oil derivatives  Croatian Energy Regulatory Council   2002 
  Securities market  Croatian Securities Commission  1996 
  Telecommunications Telecommunication  Council  2002 
  Radio and television  Radio and Telecommunications Council  2000 
Macedonia  Competition  Anti-Monopoly Office & Anti-Monopoly 
Commission  2000 
  Electricity, gas and district heating  Energy Regulatory Commission  2003 
  Banking and savings institutions  Supervisory Department at the National 
Bank of Macedonia   1992 
  Securities market  Securities & Exchange Commission  1992 
  Broadcasting of State and commercial 
radio and TV  Council for Radio & TV Broadcast  2000 
  Telecommunications network and 
frequency licensing  Directorate for Telecommunications  2000 
Moldova  Energy   National Energy Regulatory Agency   1997 
  Telecommunications and informaton 
technologies 
National Regulatory Agency for 
Telecommunications and Informatics  2000 
Montenegro  Capital market  Securities Commission  2002 
  Telecommunication  Agency for Telecommunication  2001 
Romania  Competition Competition  Council 1996 
  Electricity   Electricity and Heat Regulatory 
Authority   1998 
  Natural gas   Natural Gas Regulatory Authority   2000 
  All operators  National Romanian Regulator of 
Communal Services  2002 
  All capital markets and non-banking 
financial services agents 
Romanian National Securities 
Commission   1994 
 
Electronic communications sector 
General Inspectorate for 
Communications and Information 
Technology  
2002 
  Electronic communications, postal 
sectors, and public communication 
network 
National Regulatory Authority for 
Communications   2002 
Serbia  Competition Antimonopoly  Commission  1997 
  Energy   Energy Regulatory Agency  2003 
  Securities market  Securities Commission  1990  45
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